Prof. Jayanth R. Varma's Financial Markets Blog

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Google stock screener

Google Finance has launched a stock screener that allows the user to screen stocks based on several criteria including a number of balance sheet and profitability variables, several valuation metrics as well as variables related to stock price performance. This tool makes possible a variety of analyses that could earlier be done only by those with an expensive Bloomberg or Reuters terminal. However, the universe is limited to about four thousand stocks which is much less than you would get if you subscribe to one of the commercial services.

For example, one can list the stocks with a market capitalization of more than a billion dollars that have a negative beta. There are fifteen of them, but several are bond funds or ETFs.

It is also interesting to just list the tops stocks by market capitalization and observe that three of the top five stocks are from China and Brazil.

I wish they would also allow screening by industry and geography. The query string in the URL clearly shows that sector and exchange are potential search fields, but these do not appear to be enabled as of now.

Posted at 9:48 pm IST on Thu, 3 Apr 2008         permanent link

Categories: miscellaneous

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FSA Review of Northern Rock Supervision

The Financial Services Authority of the UK has published an executive summary of a review carried out by its internal audit division into its supervision of Northern Rock. It has also published the recommendations of this review as well as a high level summary of the Supervisory Enhancement Programme that it has undertaken in response to the Internal Audit Report.

It is possible that the executive summary is a somewhat sanitized version of the report, but I did not find anything interesting in it. It is always possible to criticize the original supervisory process with the benefit of hindsight; the published summary does not to my mind rise above this to any clear evidence of supervisory lapses. Moreover if it is true that “the supervision of Northern Rock was at the extreme end of the spectrum within the firms reviewed in respect of these failings and that its supervision did not reflect the general practice of supervision of high-impact firms at the FSA,” then it does not make sense to embark on a major supervisory enhancement.

The decision that in future, “High-impact firms will be a key area of supervisory focus, regardless of probability of failure” is also a little puzzling to me. Impact and probability of failure should jointly guide the supervisory effort and the decision does not make sense unless it is believed that it is not possible to make a reliable assessment of the probability of failure.

Posted at 6:28 pm IST on Wed, 26 Mar 2008         permanent link

Categories: crisis, investigation

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Deliciously timed move to margin institutions

It was perhaps pure coincidence but the timing was still delicious – just two days after the collapse and bail-out of the US investment bank, Bear Stearns, the Securities and Exchange Board of India announced that even institutional investors in the Indian stock market would have to pay margins to back their trades. SEBI was careful to say that the move was designed to create a level playing field since non institutional investors already pay margins. But the fact remains that the move will also make the market safer. Exchanges are designed to eliminate counter party risk by interposing a central counter party which relies on collateral instead of making assumptions about the solvency of its counter parties. Traditionally, it has been assumed that margins are needed only in derivative markets and not in cash markets that settle in a couple of days. The speed with which Bear Stearns collapsed suggests that this assumption is dubious. SEBI is right to margin all investors in the cash market as well.

Posted at 10:52 am IST on Sun, 23 Mar 2008         permanent link

Categories: equity markets, exchanges, risk management

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Is Warren Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway a hedge fund?

Aleablog reports that the market is worried about the default risk of Warren Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway – CDS spreads have widened from 20 basis points in November 2007 to almost 120 basis points in mid March 2008. I spent some time reading Buffet’s letter to shareholders as well as Berkshire Hathaway’s annual report for 2007.

What struck me was that Berkshire Hathaway is becoming more and more like a hedge fund than a mutual fund. The transformation has been gradual. In his 2002 annual report, Buffet famously declared that “derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.”. He also wrote that “When Charlie and I finish reading the long footnotes detailing the derivatives activities of major banks, the only thing we understand is that we don’t understand how much risk the institution is running.”

What a difference five years makes! In the 2007 letter, Buffet writes that Berkshire had 94 derivatives that he managed himself (up from 62 the previous year). Buffet does not use derivatives for hedging – in his 2006 letter, he wrote that he buys derivatives when he thinks they are wildly mispriced. As at the end of 2007, Hathaway had derivatives positions with a notional value of about $50 billion. The biggest chunk of these ($35 billion notional) are written put options on equity indices. That reminds me of LTCM which too had written large amounts of put options on equity indices. Berkshire has sold credit protection for $5 billion of notional value of junk bonds – too small to remind me of the bond insurers. During the last few years, Berkshire has speculated on a wide range of currencies, though it has unwound most of them at a profit. That reminds me of George Soros.

There does appear to be a big difference between the big hedge funds and Berkshire – the absence of leverage. But, probe a little deeper, and even this is not so obvious. A large part of Bekshire’s investment portfolio comes out of the $59 billion float of its huge insurance business of which $46 billion comes from the reinsurance companies. Reinsurance is best thought of as written put options on non traded or illiquid assets.

Berkshire today is not the simple investment company that it was a decade ago. Today it is in the business of writing put options (financial derivatives and reinsurance) and investing the proceeds in stocks. What Buffet wrote about the activities of major banks in 2002 is gradually becoming true of Berkshire. Rising CDS premiums are perhaps not so surprising.

Posted at 12:52 pm IST on Sat, 15 Mar 2008         permanent link

Categories: derivatives

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Is this the beginning of the end of credit rating?

A report by the US President’s Working Group (PWG) on Financial Markets released on Thursday could well be the beginning of the end of credit rating. It says

Overseers should ensure that [institutional] investors (and their asset managers) develop an independent view of the risk characteristics of the instruments in their portfolios, rather than rely solely on credit ratings.

...

The PWG member agencies will reinforce steps taken by the CRAs through revisions to supervisory policy and regulation, including regulatory capital requirements that use ratings.

In a different context, the report also says that “U.S. authorities should encourage other supervisors of global firms to make complementary efforts to develop guidance along the same lines.”

There is therefore a serious possibility that global regulators would wean institutional investors away from the use of ratings and also reduce the regulatory role of ratings. If that were to happen, would the rating agencies survive only on the basis of retail investors relying on the ratings? I doubt that very much. Long ago when Eurobonds were bought by Belgian dentists, ratings were hardly influential. Bonds were bought on the basis of name recognition – companies like IBM, Coca Cola and Walt Disney could borrow easily because they and their products were well known.

It is true that when the rating agencies began life a century ago, they did not need a regulatory monopoly to prosper. But that was before Altman showed that creditworthiness could be easily measured using econometric models based on accounting information and before the Merton model showed that the stock price by itself provides adequate information.

Posted at 10:26 am IST on Sat, 15 Mar 2008         permanent link

Categories: credit rating, regulation

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Theory building in real time

The global turmoil of 2007-08 has been a crisis in slow motion that has allowed an astonishing amount of theory building and conceptualization to happen in real time even as the crisis is evolving. I think that the theorization is much greater both quantitatively and qualitiatively than what I saw during the Asian (and LTCM) crisis of 1997-98 which was also a crisis in slow motion. I have spend the last several days reading and digesting a part of the huge literature that has emerged. That explains why there have been no posts on my blog for a long time now. The sense that I get is that, at a deeper theoretical level, what has happened is not quite so puzzling though financial market participants find the crisis inexplicable.

I will not attempt to summarize all the excellent work that I have been reading – they all deserve to be read in full. I shall just provide the links:

Posted at 3:43 pm IST on Tue, 11 Mar 2008         permanent link

Categories: crisis

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Vulture funds restructuring sub prime home loans

Bloomberg has an interesting story (hat tip Aleablog) about how vulture funds are buying up delinquent mortgages and then reducing the interest rate to allow the borrower to resume payments.

A market solution like this appears to be a better strategy than the loan waivers that we are seeing in India and the government sponsored home loan restructuring that is being proposed in the United States.

Posted at 6:47 pm IST on Fri, 29 Feb 2008         permanent link

Categories: bankruptcy, bond markets, crisis

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FICO scores and subprime defaults

Thomas Brown has an interesting article at bankstocks.com which indicates that US mortgage defaults might not be driven by low FICO scores at all. Brown compares the various mortgage pools underlying the widely tracked ABX index and shows that in many cases, the worst performing pools have higher FICO scores than the best performing pools. In some cases, the average FICO scores of the worst pools are around 640 so that they do not even count as subprime according to the standard definition. Until last year, subprime was generally defined as FICO scores below 620, but after the subprime turmoil began, some lenders have raised the cutoff to as high as 680.

In some sense, this is not surprising. FICO scores are not about creditworthiness as measured by income, assets or cash flows. They are simply about past credit histories. If a household with an impeccable credit history is given a housing loan that is well beyond what it can afford in terms of its income levels, the FICO score would be excellent, but the default risk would be high.

Brown’s data shows a clear pattern where pools originated by some lenders like Wells Fargo have the lowest default rates while those originated by other lenders like WMC have the highest default rates. Geography matters too – the worst pools have high exposure to some of the most frothy housing markets of 2006.

Brown interprets his data to mean that mortgage losses are not likely to be as high as feared because many subprime mortgages will not default. While I grant this, an equally valid conclusion from the data is that many non subprime mortgages will default because the trajectory of housing prices matters more than FICO scores.

All this has implications for India where many hopes are being pinned on the creation of credit registries and similar agencies that would make FICO-like scores possible in India as well. In a country where recovery is even harder than in the United States, excessive reliance on credit histories might not be such a good idea at all. The smartest crooks will build excellent credit histories with a series of small loans until they can take out a large loan. Long ago in the United States, the term Brazilian straddle was used to describe a huge market position which the trader intended to run away from if it proved unprofitable (the other leg of the straddle was supposed to be a one way air ticket to Brazil). What the equivalent straddle should be called in India is left to the imagination of the reader. I would confine myself to the observation that credit histories provide little protection against such straddles.

Posted at 5:01 pm IST on Thu, 21 Feb 2008         permanent link

Categories: bond markets, credit rating

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XBRL - Is India missing the bus?

Nearly two months after the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) launched its XBRL enabled electronic filing platform, no XBRL tools are available on this platform, while the corresponding platform in the US continues to innovate in providing increasingly better and more powerful interactive tools to view and analyze the data. On Friday, the US SEC unveiled its new XBRL tool, Financial Explorer, which prompted me to do a quick comparison.

I looked up Infosys Technologies in the Indian filing system and got static tabular data with which one cannot do anything meaningful except by downloading it. Unfortunately, the site does not appear to allow the data to be downloaded in XBRL or any other usable format. I then went to the SEC’s Interactive Financial Viewer and could download the raw XBRL filing as well export the data into Excel. I could also compare the filing of Infosys with that of Satyam in parallel columns. The power of XBRL allows similar elements in the two filings to be lined up correctly in this tabulation while also providing data in each that is not present in the other. The site also allows the user to chart the data choosing the rows and columns of data that is to be charted.

I then went to the Financial Explorer page and saw how various interactive charts could be produced from the XBRL data. These charts rely on the semantic information embedded in XBRL. For example, since XBRL encapsulates knowledge of what are the elements of shareholder equity, it can generate a chart explaining the changes in shareholder equity in terms of the changes in its constituent elements.

Above all, the SEC is providing the source code for most of its application at its XBRL viewers page and is encouraging software developers to take this and build other tools based on this. In a couple of years from today, I expect that financial data will be shared, analyzed and presented using XBRL tools. I have previously argued that one day financial statements will also be prepared using XBRL tools.

SEBI certainly needs to do far more than it has done so far to bring the power of these exciting tools to Indian investors.

Posted at 2:51 pm IST on Sun, 17 Feb 2008         permanent link

Categories: accounting, regulation, technology

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Unbundling derivatives clearing from trading

The US Department of Justice has put out a very well argued and cogent paper arguing that unbundling derivatives clearing from trading would lead to greater competition in derivative trading with attendant benefits in terms of greater innovation and lower costs for the users of derivatives.

The DOJ’s theoretical reasoning is quite sound:

If exchanges did not control clearing, an appropriately regulated clearinghouse could treat contracts with identical terms from different exchanges as interchangeable, i.e., fungible. The incentives of such a clearinghouse would be to maximize its own profits, and it thus likely would treat identical contracts as fungible. In a world of fungible financial futures contracts, multiple exchanges could simultaneously attract liquidity in the same or similar futures contract, facilitating sustained head-to-head competition. A trader could open a position on one exchange and close it on another. In such a world, a trader could execute against the best price wherever offered without fear of being unable to exit the position because there is insufficient trading interest (or of being forced to exit at a poor price) on the new entrant trading venue when a trader chooses to exit.

In addition, if exchanges did not control clearing, an appropriately regulated clearinghouse could reduce member margin obligations by recognizing offsetting positions in correlated financial futures contracts traded on different exchanges. The ability to offset correlated positions in a futures clearinghouse can significantly reduce the capital required to trade.

This theoretical reasoning is backed up by some excellent discussion about the attempted entry of Eurex into US Treasury futures as well as of other competitive battles in the derivative industry.

But the most important confirmation came from the stock market: the share price of the CME Group that runs the largest derivative exchange in the US dropped by 18% after these comments were released and rose again after subsequent news reports suggested that the proposed changes were unlikely to happen anytime soon.

Posted at 5:00 pm IST on Tue, 12 Feb 2008         permanent link

Categories: derivatives, exchanges, regulation

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Socgen scandal becomes murkier

My blog four days ago stated that there was perhaps more to the Socgen fraud than meets the eye, and the deluge of information since then confirms this first impression. It is pointless to even attempt to cite all the stories that have come out in the last few days and I will be very selective. Socgen’s own five page non explanation of what happened is of course mandatory reading, but the Aleablog, the Alphaville blog, the Financial Times and the Independent have been the best English sources – the truly best sources are obviously in French. Another quick observation is that the blogs have been better at covering this than the mainstream media.

The issues that emerge are the following:

Posted at 5:13 pm IST on Tue, 29 Jan 2008         permanent link

Categories: crisis, fraud

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Margin Changes in Exchange Traded Derivatives

Surjit Bhalla wrote a provocative piece in the Business Standard yesterday describing the system of automatic revision of margins in Indian stock exchanges as ugly and insane – the first adjective is quite appropriate, but the second is not. Bhalla is right in saying that the Indian system is different from what the rest of the world does, but it does not follow that the system is wrong, much less that it is insane.

Most exchanges around the world change margins infrequently and in a discretionary manner. Everywhere in the world, market turbulence does lead to a rise in margins. Last week itself when the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) left margins unchanged on stock index futures, it raised margins on interest rate futures sharply in response to increased volatility. What the Indian system does is (a) to take the discretion out of the system completely and (b) to make the revisions more frequent.

The system adopted in India is similar to the internal models that banks and securities firms use to monitor and control the risk of their trading positions. Like any other sound margining system, it does have the potential to create a vicious cycle of falling prices, margin calls, unwinding of levered positions and further price falls. It is ugly but it can hardly be called insane.

It is also true that there is significant over-margining in the Indian system. Partly, this reflects a greater risk aversion on the part of Indian regulators and the broader political system. As Indian regulators and politicians become more comfortable with well functioning derivative markets, the risk aversion should decline. The over-margining is also due to the lower level of capitalization of securities firms in India which forces exchanges and brokers to rely almost entirely on margins to ensure solvency. As Indian brokerages consolidate and shore up their capital base, this problem should also get attenuated. Over a period of time, therefore, the margining system could become more relaxed – both in terms of lower quantum of margins and in terms of lower urgency in raising margins in response to volatility spikes.

What India does need urgently is an abandonment of informal and ad hoc margin tightening in times of crises. One keeps hearing anecdotes about members being asked to reduce positions or deposit more margins than is mandated by the regular margining system. A greater degree of transparency in this regard would also be welcome so that false rumours do not circulate about this.

Posted at 8:47 pm IST on Sun, 27 Jan 2008         permanent link

Categories: derivatives, regulation, risk management

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How to lose $7.1 billion

The announcement by Societe Generale that a rogue trader had caused losses of $7.1 billion was cryptic and baffling. The press release says that the bank:

has uncovered a fraud, exceptional in its size and nature: one trader, responsible for plain vanilla futures hedging on European equity market indices, had taken massive fraudulent directional positions in 2007 and 2008 beyond his limited authority. Aided by his in-depth knowledge of the control procedures resulting from his former employment in the middle-office, he managed to conceal these positions through a scheme of elaborate fictitious transactions.

Assuming that the indices in question have fallen by about 20% in line with the broad European equity index, the notional value of the plain vanilla futures position must have been over $35 billion. That a trade of this size could be concealed by an isolated individual appears difficult to believe since most large banks have internalized the lessons from Leeson’s fraudulent trades at Barings more than a decade ago. I have a sense that there is more to this than meets the eye.

Posted at 1:41 pm IST on Fri, 25 Jan 2008         permanent link

Categories: crisis, fraud

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Compensation of bankers (and their regulators)

Raghuram Rajan wrote a provocative article (“Bankers’ pay is deeply flawed,” Financial Times, January 9, 2008) arguing that “Significant portions of [bankers’] compensation should be held in escrow to be paid only long after the activities that generated that compensation occur.” Martin Wolf agreed enthusiastically with this idea and went further “Yet individual institutions cannot change their systems of remuneration on their own, without losing talented staff to the competition. So regulators may have to step in. The idea of such official intervention is horrible, but the alternative of endlessly repeated crises is even worse. ” (“Why regulators should intervene in bankers’ pay,” Financial Times, January 16, 2008).

I agree with the basic idea that incentives are critically important but would like to go down a different fork. Why not link the pay of bank supervisors to the fate of the banks that they supervisors? If 50% of the pay of those who supervised Northern Rock were in escrow in an uninsured deposit in Northern Rock itself, I suspect that the stress tests that the supervisors carried out would have been a little tougher. I recall reading that long ago when private clearing houses performed some kind of deposit insurance and lender of last resort functions, they did sometimes hire supervisors on somewhat similar terms. The advantage is that this proposal requires regulators to change only their own HR practices and not of everybody else in the world.

In a similar vein, investors could put pressure on the rating agencies to invest a large percentage of their rating fees in the securities that they rate (with the percentage being higher for high ratings). If this had been in force, I very much doubt whether there would have been so many AAA ratings in the sub prime CDO space.

Posted at 1:43 pm IST on Fri, 18 Jan 2008         permanent link

Categories: banks, corporate governance, crisis

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Will Stoneridge save the banks and the rating agencies?

The decision of the US Supreme Court in the Stoneridge case is doubtless a victory for business, but I doubt whether it will be enough to save the banks and the rating agencies when it comes to the inevitable sub prime related litigation. The court refused to allow investors to sue “entities who, acting both as customers and suppliers, agreed to arrangements that allowed the investors’ company to mislead its auditor and issue a misleading financial statement affecting the stock price.”

I am not a lawyer, but I think the penultimate paragraph of the opinion seems clear enough: “Unconventional as the arrangement was, it took place in the marketplace for goods and services, not in the investment sphere. ... In these circumstances the investors cannot be said to have relied upon any of respondents’ deceptive acts in the decision to purchase or sell securities; and as the requisite reliance cannot be shown, respondents have no liability to petitioner under the implied right of action. ”

While agreeing that that the anti fraud provisions of securities law are not “limited to preserving the integrity of the securities markets,” the court asserts that these provisions do “not reach all commercial transactions that are fraudulent and affect the price of a security in some attenuated way.”

I do not see how any of this will help the originators and underwriters of sub prime securities or the agencies that rated them if their actions turn out to be fraudulent. It will take a lot of investigative effort to determine whether there was fraudulent behaviour (and even more effort to establish the fraud if any in a court of law), but private players have every incentive to expend this effort.

Posted at 12:21 pm IST on Thu, 17 Jan 2008         permanent link

Categories: accounting, credit rating, fraud, law, regulation

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SEBI loses case on misleading recommendations

Last week, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) lost a high profile case regarding misleading investment recommendations: the Securities Appelate Tribunal (SAT) set aside the SEBI order against Mathew Easow.

SEBI’s order in September 2006 stated that “While Mathew Easow has been advising the market to buy a stock, he himself has taken contrary positions. This indicates an obvious attempt to mislead the investors through investment recommendations, in a striking posture of ambivalence coupled with interest. ”

On appeal, SAT was scathing in its criticism:

We cannot uphold any of these findings which are based on a complete misreading of the recommendations made through the e-mails. ... We are amazed that the adjudicating officer could not understand this basic concept. Unfortunately, the adjudicating officer did not apply his mind to the merits of the recommendations made by Mathew. He did not even make an attempt to understand what the recommendations meant.

...

In view of the aforesaid discussion, we allow the appeal, reverse the findings recorded by the adjudicating officer and set aside the impugned order. The damage caused to the reputation of Mathew cannot be undone. However, he will have his costs which are assessed at Rs.1 lac.

There is an enormous conflict of interest inherent in a person making investment recommendations while also trading in the same securities. Disclosures and disclaimers coupled with investor education are meant to address this conflict of interest. The facts that SEBI has brought on record do not appear to be sufficient to elevate this inherent conflict of interest to the level of a “a fraudulent or an unfair trade practice”. We do not know whether a more thorough investigation and a deeper analysis would have led to a different set of facts and a different set of conclusions. However, based only on the facts that are available in the SEBI order and the SAT judgement, I find it difficult to disagree with the SAT.

Posted at 7:17 pm IST on Wed, 16 Jan 2008         permanent link

Categories: regulation

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Moody's archaeology is quite unconvincing

Last week, Moody’s published a report on the global credit crisis (Archaeology of the Crisis) that I found totally unconvincing. To begin with, the word “archaeology” in relation to such a recent event is perplexing, but that is a minor issue.

My most serious disagreement is with the section in the report on “Reduced risk traceability in the financial innovation process”. Moody’s argue:

Rating agencies were supposed to bridge some of the information asymmetries, but this proved to be some-what unrealistic when the incentive structure of (sub-prime) loan originators, subprime loan borrowers, and market intermediaries also shifted in favour of less information.

... The problem in the case of extreme complexity of inter-connecting financial systems is that it is hard to see how the level of information could reach levels adequate to enable reasonable risk management standards.

Risk traceability has declined, probably forever. It is extremely unlikely that in today’s markets we will ever know on a timely basis where every risk lies.

This leads to two conclusions. First, more capital buffers will be needed or required by counterparties and regulators. Second, not just more but more intelligible information is needed ...

Moody’ is trying to argue that rating agencies failed because the task that they were asked to do was impossible. The first problem with this argument is that they should have thought about this before they accepted the rating assignment and collected their fees. The second problem is that the solution of greater capital buffers (higher attachment points for various rated tranches) was available to the rating agencies all along, but they chose not to go this route.

The third problem with Moody’ argument is that it is becoming increasingly clear that the credit crisis that we are seeing today has nothing to do with financial innovation but is more like the familiar credit and banking crises of the past. For example, it is quite similar to the Japanese banking crisis of the 1990s which also had its origins in a property market collapse.

In August of 2007, it was possible to argue that the credit crisis was somehow related to the difficulty of valuing complex financial instruments like CDOs. One might have thought that credit correlations (which are difficult to estimate) might have been underestimated but there was no problem with the core credit assessment. However, the fall in prices of sub prime linked instruments has been so steep and persistent that it is now clear that the issue is not about correlations but about the value of the underlying credit. A good deal of this underlying value depends on macroeconomic variables like housing prices and GDP growth where there is little if any information asymmetry.

Today, the rating agencies can really take one of only two positions. Either they can admit that they made a grave error in estimating credit risk in a whole large class of credits without any significant attenuating circumstances. Or they can argue that the markets have got it all wrong and the credit quality of sub prime and alt-A housing loans is not as bad as the market thinks. With every passing week of new data coming in from the US, the second position looks increasingly untenable.

In 2001, when the rating agencies were severely criticized for their failures in relation to Enron, I argued that the most that one could accuse them of was some degree of complacence. I wrote: “Any criticism about the rating agencies must keep in mind that the agencies gave Enron a rating that reflected a high level of risk.” Moreover, there were significant information asymmetries between the rating agencies and Enron. The asymmetries in sub prime lending were much lower and the rating agencies had the law of large numbers on their side. I think therefore that a mea culpa would be more appropriate than the kind of archaeological sophistry that Moody’s has dished out to us.

Posted at 4:23 pm IST on Mon, 14 Jan 2008         permanent link

Categories: credit rating

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Change in my phone numbers

My telephone numbers will change around January 15, 2008. The first digit will change from 2 to 6. The office number will become 6632 4867 and the residence number will become 6632 5318.

Posted at 1:39 pm IST on Tue, 8 Jan 2008         permanent link

Categories: miscellaneous

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Short selling moves closer to reality

RBI’s new year gift on December 31, 2007 approving short selling by FIIs moved short selling one step closer to reality in India. The financial press reports that February 1, 2008 would be the launch date for short selling and securities lending, but there is no confirmation about this on the web site of SEBI.

Posted at 7:15 pm IST on Sun, 6 Jan 2008         permanent link

Categories: crisis, regulation, short selling

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Short Selling at Long Last?

In February 2007, the Indian Finance Minister announced in his budget speech that institutions would be allowed to short sell and that a securities lending mechanism would be put in place. Nearly ten months later, The Securities and Exchange Board of India has announced the Broad framework for securities lending and borrowing and the Broad framework for short selling but it is not yet clear as to when the exchanges would operationalize these products. Given the considerable similarities in software requirements between the proposed securities lending mechanism and the old ALBM system, I would think that the exchanges should not need more than 2-3 weeks to get this off the ground. So the absence of a specific timetable is disturbing.

Globally, the corporate world hates short selling and does its best to discredit it and even prevent it if possible. In the US for example, the SEC took 70 years to remove short sale restrictions and even that happened only after Enron had weakened the credibility of corporate America. Even now, the SEC is to my mind unduly harsh on what it calls “abusive short selling” as I discussed in my blog post earlier this year.

In India too, I know from my conversations with corporate leaders that corporate India does not like short selling and would like the proposals to be diluted and delayed as much as possible. After I expressed this fear publicly in a television interview earlier this week, I have been assured by the regulators at the highest level that they do not feel any pressure from the corporate sector and would not be swayed by any pressure even if it were sought to be applied. I can only conclude that the corporate lobby is concentrating on those whose convictions on short selling are weaker and can therefore be more easily swayed. Since the short selling and securities lending framework require concurrence of the tax authorities and of the central bank while operationalization requires action by the exchanges and perhaps the depositories, opponents of short selling have many avenues open to them to delay if not block much needed reform.

I have been arguing the case for free short selling for several years now to the point of beginning to sound like a broken record:

In India, [severe restrictions on short selling] are the single most important culprit for the frequency and severity of episodes of stock market manipulation that have taken place in this country during the last decade. Indian Journal of Political Economy, October-December 2002

A market without short selling is an open invitation to company managements and other manipulators to rig up the prices of stocks.(Business Line March 15, 2004)

Removal of all restrictions on short-selling would be the single most important step towards making Indian capital markets cleaner, safer and more efficient.(Economic Times, October 3, 2005)

But I think the battle is not over yet. All of us who have a stake in clean and vibrant capital markets must therefore keep up the vigil to ensure that unscrupulous corporate managements do not succeed in delaying this reform any further.

It is equally important to move quickly beyond the broad framework that has been published now. First, short selling needs to be quickly expanded beyond the derivative stocks to at least the top 1,000 or 2,000 stocks as I discussed in my blog post two years ago. Second, the position limits need to be increased substantially. Third, mechanisms for borrowing stocks for much longer periods than seven days need to be created. The proposed framework requires gross settlement at client level so that even a roll over of the seven day contract into the next contract would be cumbersome. Global experience suggests that when short positions are established in stocks on the suspicion of fraud or misreporting by the company, the position has to be maintained for several months for the short sellers to expose the fraud and make a profit on the position.

But all these problems should not hold up progress. The better should not become the enemy of the good. SEBI, RBI and the exchanges must work hard to make short selling and securities lending a reality in January 2008.

Posted at 3:09 pm IST on Wed, 26 Dec 2007         permanent link

Categories: regulation, short selling

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FASB tries to define equity and liability

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the United States has put out a very interesting document outlining its preliminary views on a consistent definition of equity and liabilities. As highlighted in Table 2 at the end of the document, the FASB proposals would involve substantial changes in current accounting practice. In particular, it would allow gains or losses to be recognized when a company enters into derivative transactions on its own stock.

Years ago, while writing a paper on Enron, I came across instances where current accounting treatment for such transactions is not in line with economic realities, but thought that the changes required to bring them in alignment would be too drastic for accountants to countenance. It is fascinating to find that FASB is prepared to contemplate making these drastic changes and it is likely that the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) would move in the same direction as well.

Posted at 1:39 pm IST on Mon, 10 Dec 2007         permanent link

Categories: accounting, derivatives

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SEC Admits that it Rigged Share Prices!

I find it hard to believe this, but the SEC press release explicitly says that as part of its sting operation, it and the FBI did actually manipulate the share market – the SEC/FBI “bought the stock defendants were promoting. Every buy transaction had a material effect on the stock trading volume of the companies in question”. Will the SEC/FBI compensate genuine investors who traded on the basis of the false volumes or prices? The SEC says “Our office worked closely with the criminal authorities and provided information and technical assistance throughout the FBI sting operation in order to minimize harm to innocent investors.” But minimize is not the same as prevent.

Another puzzling thing in the press release is that after saying that “In fact, there was no hedge fund”, it goes on to say that “the hedge fund bought the stock”. Perhaps, it was a drafting error in the press release.

Posted at 4:35 pm IST on Sun, 9 Dec 2007         permanent link

Categories: manipulation, regulation

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Financial markets and financial information

There is a chicken and egg relation between financial markets and financial information: the markets need data to function well but the data is generated only when the markets become vibrant. This was my response to Peeyush Mishra who emailed me this week with a comparison of the richness of data that is available about the US housing market (OFHEO, Case-Shiller, NAR, NAHB and Commerce Department) with the paucity of such data for India. Peeyush asked me whether we should make a sustained push to collect and organize more of this data and put it in the national domain.

My argument was that we have already traveled down this top-down route with the National Statistical Commission that submitted its report in 2001 and the National Statistical Commission that was established in 2006 following the recommendations of that report.

The alternative (bottom-up) approach is to rely on the demand pull that emerges from well developed financial markets. These markets not only create demand for financial data, but this demand is backed by willingness to pay for the data – it is as the economists like to say “effective demand”. Both private sector and public sector providers respond to this demand. It may appear surprising but it is a fact that even Indian public sector providers respond to private sector demand for data particularly when this demand starts being met by private sector providers. Once they get into the game, public providers also sometimes try to shut out the private providers on vague grounds related to the integrity of the data. Viewed in this light, the main reason why the US has such rich data on housing is the huge mortgage and mortgage derivative market in that country.

It is also true that data providers (both private and public) are more reliable when the data they generate is used by financial markets than when it used primarily by academics. This is because while academics are content to run some outlier tests and get rid of the worst errors in the data, market participants have less tolerance for mistakes in the data. The private sector can also help in scrutinizing the validity of the methodology. For example, in 2003, Statistics South Africa was forced to correct flaws in the estimation of the housing rentals component of the consumer price index in response to complaints by analysts.

Posted at 3:55 pm IST on Fri, 7 Dec 2007         permanent link

Categories: derivatives, regulation, statistics

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Can governments be trusted with financial data?

When the UK government loses CDs containing name, addresses, date of birth, child benefit and national insurance numbers and bank details relating to 25 million people (40% of the population), we must ask the question whether governments can be trusted with financial information on a large scale.

A comment by a reader of the Times Online underscored the gravity of the problem:

Given the large number of government employees that clearly have access to these databases, if the administration and security systems in place allow for this kind of data to be burned onto an external removable disc, then it is inevitable that such data already has been (or will be) deliberately taken and sold to identity theft fraudsters by a modestly paid, unscrupulous civil servant (it is unfortunately naive to assume everyone is honest).

This is an issue that has largely been addressed in banks and other financial institutions who have historically held our private data, and who have measures in place to prevent such extraction of confidential data.

The idea of a “momentary blunder” or accidental loss seems to miss the real risk.

It is true that the private sector is a little better at handling data, but then the US telecom operators have shown that they are more than happy to part with data to the government even when the government requests the data illegally.

In the Indian context, I am worried about the huge amount of data that is being collected under the tax information network. Moreover, as India makes hesitant moves towards electronic payment systems, there seems to be a great deal of eagerness on the part of everybody including the tax authorities to collect and preserve all the transaction data. If somebody wants to do data mining on a few petabytes of data, that is fine, but who will ensure the safety of all the data? Whom can we sue if the data is lost or stolen?

Posted at 5:43 pm IST on Wed, 28 Nov 2007         permanent link

Categories: fraud, regulation, technology

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New Derivative Products in India

Yesterday, the Financial Express published an interview with me on the proposal by SEBI earlier this month to launch new derivative products. I made two main points:

Posted at 5:06 pm IST on Sat, 24 Nov 2007         permanent link

Categories: derivatives, regulation

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Deposit Insurance and Northern Rock

The flurry of comments and discussion that followed Mervyn King’s interview to the BBC on November 6, 2007 have led me to the conclusion that the true lessons from Northern Rock are largely about deposit insurance and not about bank supervision.

Mervyn King’s interview about the handling of Northern Rock prompted a series of comments last week in the Financial Times by Philip Stevens, Willem Buiter and Martin Wolf. This has prompted me to revisit Northern Rock which I blogged about last month here and here. I am even more convinced than before that the Northern Rock episode does not reveal fundamental flaws with the model of unified regulation and separation of monetary policy from bank supervision. I also think that King’s decision to provide liquidity only at penal rates and against top class collateral was quite correct. Mervyn King said in his interview:

If you look at what the European Central Bank lent to banks through their auctions that they conducted, relative to the size of the banking system they lent an average of 230 million pounds per bank participating in their auctions. Northern Rock needed something closer to 25 billion, 100 times larger than the average amount which the European Central Bank was lending to banks through their auctions. The scale of the funding that was needed was staggeringly large.

...

So could we have had an auction that was sufficiently large that all the banks would have got 20 to 30 billion and Northern Rock wouldn’t have been noticed in that process? Well, that would have been an auction on a scale 50 odd times that which any other Central Bank had engaged in. And I’m absolutely convinced that the first question you would have asked on that day is: “What on earth must have happened to the entire British banking system to have merited an auction of that size?” We were doing this not to bail out the British banking system, which didn’t need bailing out, but actually to get money into one institution that needed it.

In my view, the lessons from Northern Rock are:

Posted at 5:44 pm IST on Sun, 18 Nov 2007         permanent link

Categories: bankruptcy, crisis, investigation

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OTC Equity Derivatives in India

I wrote an article in the Business Standard today arguing for the creation of an OTC equity derivative market in India.

I made the following points

Posted at 3:55 pm IST on Wed, 14 Nov 2007         permanent link

Categories: derivatives, equity markets, exchanges

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Quiet Period in US Public Offerings

Earlier this year, I blogged about the problems created by the quiet period during public offerings of shares in the United States. The Lex column on “Quiet Periods” in the Financial Times yesterday raises the same issues and refers to the Blackstone example that I mentioned in my blog posting. Lex concludes by saying that the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should put the “onus on companies to talk rather than hide”. This is a very elegant way of putting it. Regulations must always impose a duty to disclose rather than a duty to keep quiet.

Posted at 4:41 pm IST on Tue, 13 Nov 2007         permanent link

Categories: equity markets, regulation

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Northern Rock and Unified Regulators

In my previous post today, I described what I had learnt about managing liquidity risk from studying Northern Rock; in this post, I shall discuss the implications for the regulatory architecture (separation of bank supervision from the monetary authority).

Many observers appear to think that Northern Rock has revealed the dangers of the UK system of separating bank supervision from the central bank. In my view, it has on the contrary, revealed the strengths of this system. It is clear from the evidence, that the banking supervisor (Financial Services Authority) was keen to solve the problem of Northern Rock by making changes in monetary policy while the monetary authority (Bank of England) was unwilling to do this. If the central bank were in charge of both monetary policy and bank supervision, there is little doubt that monetary policy would have been changed to save Northern Rock. The deficiences if any in banking supervision would then have never come to light at all. This is a form of regulatory moral hazard – regulators will tweak the regulatory system to hide their failures. The UK system where the central bank is not the bank supervisor is less vulnerable to this kind of moral hazard.

That the UK had not had a bank run for 140 years prior to Northern Rock is to me a troubling thing. Banks are highly fragile institutions. If in 140 years including two world wars, a great depression, the loss of a vast empire and over three decades of chronic exchange rate difficulties, the UK did not have any bank runs, then it tells us not that banks were well regulated but that they were saved covertly. In these covert operations, doubtless the reputations of bank regulators (and perhaps bank managers) were also protected at the tax payers expense. That Northern Rock has dented many reputations is not such a bad thing by comparison.

Posted at 7:20 pm IST on Sun, 28 Oct 2007         permanent link

Categories: bankruptcy, crisis, investigation

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Liquidity Risk and Northern Rock

I have spent a fair amount of time trying to understand the collapse of Northern Rock in the United Kingdom by poring through the transcripts of the Treasury Committee hearings that took evidence from the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority and the directors of Northern Rock as well as the financial statements of Northern Rock itself.

In a separate post, I shall discuss the implications for the regulatory architecture (separation of bank supervision from the monetary authority. In this posting, I shall focus on what I have learnt from all this about managing liquidity risk:

Posted at 7:17 pm IST on Sun, 28 Oct 2007         permanent link

Categories: bankruptcy, crisis, investigation

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Can SEBI be more transparent?

The Securities and Exchange Board of India provided critical clarifications on its policies regarding offshore derivative instruments (participatory notes) issued by Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) through a video conference on Monday, but their website still has no video recordings, no transcripts, no press releases on what was revealed during this conference. (I have looked in the “What is New”, “Press Releases”, “From the Chairman” and “News Clarifications” sections of the web site and also searched the site for “video conference”. I hope it is not hidden somewhere else in the site.)

SEBI’s policy announcements on this subject have caused intra-day movements in the market index of several percent in recent days and the potential for insider trading is immense whenever SEBI issues even the smallest clarification on the subject. That a video conference on such an important subject was done without it being webcast live is regrettable; that it was not even followed up with recordings and transcripts is unacceptable.

Posted at 2:57 pm IST on Wed, 24 Oct 2007         permanent link

Categories: corporate governance, regulation

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SEBI Proposal on Participatory Notes

I wrote an article in the Business Standard today on the Discussion Paper put out by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) proposing to limit the issuance of Offshore Derivative Instruments (participatory notes) by Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) in India.

This discussion paper produced a wide range of commentary in the financial press. An excellent summary of this discussion has been put together by Ajay Shah in his blog. The key points that emerge from this analysis are:

My Business Standard article did not dwell much on any of these but focused on some of the details of the SEBI proposal.

SEBI’s first proposal is to ban participatory notes that have a derivative as the underlying. This is a very confusing statement. The intention appears to be to ensure that a participatory note is backed by a cash market position and not a derivative position. If this is what SEBI indeed wishes to do, it should explicitly ban the use of derivatives to hedge participatory notes.

SEBI should recognize that the term “underlying” is a technical term with a well defined meaning in the world of finance. The underlying of a participatory note is the instrument from which the participatory note derives its value; it is the instrument which is delivered on settlement of the participatory note or with reference to whose price the participatory note is cash settled. The “underlying” in this technical sense has nothing to do with the portfolio that the FII uses to hedge the participatory note. A participatory note that is cash settled using the Nifty index futures price has the future as the underlying even if the FII hedges it using cash equities. Similarly, if the participatory note is cash settled using the cash price of the Nifty index, its underlying is the cash index and not the index future even if the FII hedges the note using index futures.

A financial regulator should respect the semantic integrity of well defined technical terms and not abuse the term “underlying” to mean what it does not and cannot mean. In this context, the use of the word “against” before the word “underlying” in regulation 15A of the FII regulation is also unfortunate as that word is perhaps the source of this confusion.

Enough of semantics. I now turn to the substance of the proposal. If SEBI bans the use of derivatives to hedge participatory notes, it would have three implications.

  1. Since cash equities are less liquid than the futures, the hedging costs would increase. The increase would be even greater if the underlying is an index where hedging using the constituent shares is far more difficult than using the index future. If the participatory note contains some option-like features (non linear payoffs), the hedging risks could also increase as the volatility risk of options cannot be hedged using only the cash market. The FII would therefore have to charge a wider spread to its clients. OTC derivatives tend to be carry large spreads anyway (annualized costs of 4% to 8% of the notional principal are not uncommon). A mere increase in transaction costs would not probably kill the participatory note market.
  2. SEBI’s proposal would prevent participatory notes that involve a short position in Indian equities (for example by a long-short hedge fund) since short selling is not feasible in the cash market today. Since short selling is essential for a well functioning market, this is clearly an undesirable consequence of the SEBI proposal.
  3. SEBI’s proposal would also prevent issuance of participatory notes that are essentially synthetic rupee money market instruments because these synthetics can be created only by offsetting positions in cash and futures markets. It is doubtful whether any significant amount of participatory notes are of this kind.

The second major proposal of SEBI is to ban participatory notes issued by sub accounts of FIIs. In my view, this is largely an administrative measure which would not have a significant long run impact. An FII which is active enough to issue participatory notes should be willing to register as a full fledged FII.

SEBI’s third proposal is to limit participatory notes issuance by any FII to 40% of the assets under custody of that FII. Today, issuance of participatory notes is concentrated in the hands of a few FIIs. This is a very natural phenomenon. Running a derivative hedge book is a very complex activity and those with superior skills in doing this will get more business because of their lower costs and their ability to offer a wider range of products. There are also significant economies of scale in running a derivatives book because if an FII sells a long position to one offshore client and a short position to another offshore client, it needs to hedge only the net position in the Indian market. When the efficient hedgers have exhausted their 40% limits, buyers of participatory notes would have to buy from less efficient hedgers who have not reached the 40% limit. This would increase the costs and would amount to more “sand in the wheels” whose long term impact would be modest.

I also believe that the 40% limit can be circumvented by an FII buying cash equities and selling stock futures or index futures. This synthetic rupee money market position would not increase the FII’s exposure to the Indian equity market but it would increase assets under custody and allow the FII to issue more participatory notes. In the context of a strong rupee and a positive interest rate differential, this synthetic money market position may also be a profitable low risk investment for the FII. It would indeed be a delicious irony if a proposal designed partly to reduce capital inflows leads to more capital inflows.

Posted at 6:19 pm IST on Fri, 19 Oct 2007         permanent link

Categories: derivatives, equity markets, international finance

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Similarities and Differences between Banks and CDOs

In February 2006, I posted a blog entry about how banks and CDOs are very similar in their economic function. I received a couple of comments on that entry and then in August 2007, Francisco Casanova from Madrid began a long email conversation with me on the subject. All this forced to me think carefully about the issues and helped clarify my thoughts on the similarities and differences between banks and CDOs. So I decided to pull the comments and my responses into one long blog entry.

Comment Response

A CDO is a leveraged play on the underlying, banks forget that the ‘deltas’ of the underlying portfolio can be quite large and mean substantial MtM volatility.

I think a good test of the market is around the corner when the credit cycle turns and we see a number of downgrades on existing tranches making them economically unviable. (Mrinal Sharma)

A bank is also a leveraged play on the underlying loan book. But banks do not M2M their loan book and when the credit cycle turns, the impact is gradual. When there is no M2M, downgrades do not matter only defaults do.

‘Correlation risk’ and how it affects pricing is also a term misunderstood by banks and frequently ignored. (Mrinal Sharma)

Most of the risk of a bank’s loan book is also correlation risk though it is more commonly called concentration risk.

Tranching creates a slicing of risk whereby the 0-3% (in 5 years CDOs) is labeled as an equity investor. By receiving this name it would equate to the equity investor in any business, i.e., a bank. Nevertheless the actual risk/return characteristics of a non tranched equity stakeholder (i.e., a bank equity holder) are very different to those of a 0-3% holder in a CDO, aren’t they? (Francisco Casanova)

In a bank also, there are actually many tranches – demand deposits, time deposits, subordinated debt, hybrid capital and equity. If there were no central bank to bail out the bank, this would behave much like a CDO. When things start getting bad, the demand deposits will pull out quickly and will be paid out in full – this is like the AAA tranche. Time deposits might involve some loss if pulled out but the loss might be very small – an A or AA tranche. Some of the subordinated debt and hybrid capital would be like the BB tranche. Equity would be like the equity tranche.

The precise attachment points of the tranches in the CDO reflect three things – the quality of the underlying pool, the lack of central bank bail out and the rating errors of the rating agencies.

The big difference between banks and CDOs is the lender of last resort (the central bank)

Also, this permanent presence of the idiosyncratic vs systemic signals debate arising from the correlation movements in trading (which I do not know how accurately could be extrapolated to a bank), or the fact that, ceteris paribus (collateral spreads unchanged), a change in correlation reallocate expected losses among tranches in a zero sum game (i.e., an increase in default correlation expectations shifts risk allocation from junior to senior CDO tranche holders)... Or the mere fact that you can trade pure correlation views if you take delta hedged positions... (I guess you could do the same if all stakeholdings in a bank were securities form...). (Francisco Casanova)

It is interesting to note that the Basle II formula for corporate exposures is based on the same one-factor Gaussian copula models that are often used to price CDS index tranches. It is also useful to look at the following paragraphs from the second consultative package (Jan 2001) on Basle II that introduced the formula:

424. Credit risk in a portfolio arises from two sources, systematic and idiosyncratic. Systematic risk represents the effect of unexpected changes in macroeconomic and financial market conditions on the performance of borrowers. Borrowers may differ in their degree of sensitivity to systematic risk, but few firms are completely indifferent to the wider economic conditions in which they operate. Therefore, the systematic component of portfolio risk is unavoidable and undiversifiable. Idiosyncratic risk represents the effects of risks that are peculiar to individual firms, such as uncertain investments in R&D, new marketing strategies, or managerial changes. Decomposition of risk into systematic and idiosyncratic sources is useful because of the large-portfolio properties of idiosyncratic risk. As a portfolio becomes more and more fine-grained, in the sense that the largest individual exposures account for a smaller and smaller share of total portfolio exposure, idiosyncratic risk is diversified away at the portfolio level. In the limit, when a portfolio becomes “infinitely fine-grained,” idiosyncratic risk vanishes at the portfolio level, and only systematic risk remains.

425. The design and calibration of the IRB approach to regulatory capital relies on decomposing risk in this manner. Under an IRB system, the risk weight on an exposure does not depend on the bank portfolio in which the exposure is held. That is, while capital charged on a given loan reflects its own risk characteristics, such as the credit rating of the obligor and the strength of the collateral, it is not permitted to depend on the characteristics of the rest of the bank’s portfolio. To get this property of portfolio-independence, we must calibrate risk weights under the assumption of infinite granularity. Without this assumption, the appropriate capital charge for a facility would depend partly on its contribution to the aggregate idiosyncratic risk in the portfolio, and therefore would depend on what else was in the portfolio. With the assumption of infinite granularity, idiosyncratic risk can be ignored, so the appropriate capital charge for a facility depends only on the systematic component of its credit risk.

426. Of course, no real-world portfolio is infinitely fine-grained. Thus, there is always some idiosyncratic risk that has not been fully diversified away. If this residual risk is ignored, then a bank just satisfying IRB capital requirements will in fact be undercapitalised with respect to the intended regulatory soundness standard. To avoid such under-capitalisation, IRB risk weights have been scale upwards by a constant factor from the infinite granularity standard. The constant factor was chosen to approximate the effect of granularity on economic capital for a typical large bank. In order to capture variation across banks in granularity, we furthermore introduce a portfolio-level “granularity adjustment.” This additive adjustment to risk-weighted assets is negative for banks with relatively fine-grained portfolios, and positive for banks with more coarse-grained portfolios.

If the concepts of CDO and Bank are so fundamentally close, why are CDOs facing this acute lack of consensus in the valuation methodologies which is not present in the valuation of banks by equity and debt analysts? (Francisco Casanova)

  1. Banks are well diversified as compared to many CDOs. The few banks like Northern Rock that are not so diversified have seen huge valuation volatilities similar to CDOs. In the past, banks that have faced deterioration of a major part of their portfolio have seen values go down to zero very quickly. For example, think of what happened to some of the largest East Asian banks during the Asian Crisis. In the late 80s/early 90s, some analysts had a target price of zero for Citi stock before it clawed its way back from the brink.
  2. This leads to the interesting question as to why CDO investors did not apply the lessons of centuries of bank management and regulation to CDOs. Why did they accept sector concentrations that would have raised eyebrows in banking?
    • One possible answer is that this was a new field and investors were learning the lessons the hard way.
    • The other answer is that the investors were diversifying across CDOs and so risk concentration in any one CDO did not matter. If this is so, then big value changes in individual CDOs do not matter; what matter is value changes of diversified portfolios of CDOs. These latter changes have been much less dramatic.
  3. The attachment points for AAA and AA tranches in many CDOs seem to have been badly off. A well run AA rated bank probably has a capital of 10% and a price to book ratio of 1.5 implying a cushion of 15% on a globally diversified asset pool with very little sector concentration. If we apply this benchmark to a CDO, the AA attachment point was I think badly off the mark. If the rating agencies had thought of CDOs as mini banks, would they have given these ratings? I think the answer is clearly no.
  4. Bank valuations have not suffered much because they had huge liquidity support. If the central banks had gone to sleep, what would have been the volatility in the valuations of the big banks? The CDOs have had no liquidity support.
  5. It would be interesting to compare the actual default rate in investment grade CDO tranches during this crisis with the default rate of banks during the days before central banking became so widespread. I suspect the default rates have actually been lower so far, but it will take a year or so to find out.
  6. If CDOs can survive this crisis without any central bank bailout, they may emerge stronger with better risk management, better valuation models, better rating practices, greater transparency and less moral hazard. In the long run, this crisis might be the best thing that ever happened to CDOs!

Posted at 9:48 pm IST on Tue, 9 Oct 2007         permanent link

Categories: banks, derivatives

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Bank of England U-Turn

Last week, I blogged admiringly about the Bank of England paper on inter bank liquidity and moral hazard and it was embarassing to find the Bank do a U-turn within days of that paper. Mervyn King faced a hostile Treasury Committee and the transcripts of this oral testimony are quite disturbing.

King stated that he wants to carry out lender of last resort operations covertly and wants disclosure laws to be changed to make this possible. To my mind, this is totally unacceptable. The disclosure requirements of modern securities market are sacrosanct and central banks must simply learn to live with them.

The transcripts also show that King had difficulty providing a convincing explanation for his U-turn on moral hazard:

Q2 Chairman: ... In that letter of 12 September you told us that providing extra liquidity at longer maturities - in your words - undermines the efficient pricing of risk by providing ex post insurance for risky behaviour and that you would conduct such operations only if there were strong grounds for believing that the absence of ex post insurance would lead to economic costs on a scale sufficient to ignore the moral hazard in the future. However, yesterday you conducted such operations. What has changed in the past seven days?

Mr King: ... the balance of judgment between how far you extend liquidity against a wider range of collateral on the one hand and being concerned to limit the moral hazard on the other, to limit the ex post insurance, is a judgment that we are making almost daily in the febrile circumstances of the time. The operation yesterday was carefully designed and judged. It does not give ex post insurance, it is limited in size, it is limited in amount to each individual bank, and that provides a strict limit on the extent to which there is some ex post insurance, so we have balanced the concerns about moral hazard against the concerns that arose at the beginning of this week about the strains on the banking system more generally.

Q18 Chairman: When you talk about everybody knows their own job, Governor, I have to ask you this question because it has been in the public press: are you your own man? Were you lent on in this situation? Is that why you did the U-turn in the past seven days?

Mr King: No, I can assure you that the operation we carried out was designed in the Bank. Of course in these circumstances I want to discuss it with Callum McCarthy and the Chancellor. It would be very odd if they were to have woken up and found we had done this and they did not know anything about it, so of course we discussed it, but I give you my personal assurance that I would never do anything unless I thought it was the right thing to do. The independence of a central bank is not just about legislation; it is about having people in the central bank who will do what is right for the country in their job and not do what people ask them to do, whether it is the banks or whether it is politicians.

Q46 Mr Fallon: Governor, you have spoken on moral hazard and you have written us an eloquent essay on moral hazard, but is not the criticism that you have passed the theory but when it came to dealing with Northern Rock and when it came to dealing with three-month funding actually you failed the practical?

Mr King: No, I do not think that is true at all. I am happy to explain a bit later if you like why I think moral hazard is such an important issue. Can I just answer this point. I have tried to set out a sequence of events in which Northern Rock required ultimately a lender of last resort, the way in which we would have preferred to do it was not open to us, and at that point we did it in an overt way. I do not think it was at all obvious what impact that would have. It might or might not have led to people wanting to take their money out. In the event it did and once that run had started people were not behaving illogically by joining it and at that point the only solution was the Government guarantee. I think this is a very clear chain of events.

Q86 Peter Viggers: How severely do you think the principle of moral hazard has been compromised since you wrote us your rigorous and lucid letter?

Mr King: I hope that it has not and I do not believe that it has but, as I said, this is a balancing judgment. When I listened to the banks I do not believe that they felt that offering them an ability to bid for liquidity at a 100 basis point premium over bank rate was something that they regarded as entirely generous, so I think there is still a fair chunk of restriction against moral hazard in what we have done.

Posted at 9:32 pm IST on Tue, 25 Sep 2007         permanent link

Categories: crisis, regulation

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Bank of England analysis of turbulence in inter bank liquidity

The paper that the Bank of England submitted yesterday to the Treasury Committee of parliament is an unusually lucid analysis of the recent turbulence in inter bank liquidity; surprisingly, it reads more like a thoughtful blog than a ponderous official pronouncement. This certainly cements Mervyn King’s reputation as the foremost academic among central bankers. Ben Bernanke is of course not far behind – his speech day before yesterday on global imbalances was also very insightful.

King’s paper contains a careful analysis of what has happened since the beginning of August:

In summary, the turmoil in financial markets since the beginning of August stems from a reluctance by investors to purchase financial instruments backed by loans. Liquidity in asset­backed markets has dried up and a process of re­intermediation has begun, in which banks move some way back towards their traditional role taking deposits and lending them. That process is likely to be temporary but it may not be smooth. During that process, demand for liquidity by the banking system has increased, leading to a substantial rise in inter­bank rates.

King then argues (a) that monetary policy should continue to be fixated on inflation targeting and (b) the provision of liquidity in the automatic window at penal rates against high quality collateral is sufficient for the smooth functioning of the payment system.

The concluding part of the paper is sharp and brutal:

So, third, is there a case for the provision of additional central bank liquidity against a wider range of collateral and over longer periods in order to reduce market interest rates at longer maturities? This is the most difficult issue facing central banks at present and requires a balancing act between two different considerations. On the one hand, the provision of greater short­term liquidity against illiquid collateral might ease the process of taking the assets of vehicles back onto bank balance sheets and so reduce term market interest rates. But, on the other hand, the provision of such liquidity support undermines the efficient pricing of risk by providing ex post insurance for risky behaviour. That encourages excessive risk­taking, and sows the seeds of a future financial crisis. So central banks cannot sensibly entertain such operations merely to restore the status quo ante. Rather, there must be strong grounds for believing that the absence of ex post insurance would lead to economic costs on a scale sufficient to ignore the moral hazard in the future. In this event, such operations would seek to ensure that the financial system continues to function effectively.

As we move along a difficult adjustment path there are three reasons for being careful about where to tread. First, the hoarding of liquidity is a finite process ... [T]he banking system as a whole is strong enough to withstand the impact of taking onto the balance sheet the assets of conduits and other vehicles.

Second, the private sector will gradually re­establish valuations of most asset backed securities, thus allowing liquidity in those markets to build up ...

Third, the moral hazard inherent in the provision of ex post insurance to institutions that have engaged in risky or reckless lending is no abstract concept. The risks of the potential maturity transformation undertaken by off­balance sheet vehicles were not fully priced. The increase in maturity transformation implied by a change in the effective liquidity in the markets for asset­backed securities was identified as a risk by a wide range of official publications, including the Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report, over several years. If central banks underwrite any maturity transformation that threatens to damage the economy as a whole, it encourages the view that as long as a bank takes the same sort of risks that other banks are taking then it is more likely that their liquidity problems will be insured ex post by the central bank. The provision of large liquidity facilities penalises those financial institutions that sat out the dance, encourages herd behaviour and increases the intensity of future crises.

In addition, central banks, in their traditional lender of last resort (LOLR) role, can lend “against good collateral at a penalty rate” to an individual bank facing temporary liquidity problems, but that is otherwise regarded as solvent ... LOLR operations remain in the armoury of all central banks ...

...Injections of liquidity in normal money market operations against high quality collateral are unlikely by themselves to bring down the LIBOR spreads that reflect a need for banks collectively to finance the expansion of their balance sheets. To do that, general injections of liquidity against a wider range of collateral would be necessary. But unless they were made available at an appropriate penalty rate, they would encourage in future the very risk­taking that has led us to where we are ...

The key objectives remain, first, the continuous pursuit of the inflation target to maintain economic stability and, second, ensuring that the financial system continues to function effectively, including the proper pricing of risk. If risk continues to be under­priced, the next period of turmoil will be on an even bigger scale. The current turmoil, which has at its heart the earlier under­pricing of risk, has disturbed the unusual serenity of recent years, but, managed properly, it should not threaten our long­run economic stability.

Posted at 1:35 pm IST on Thu, 13 Sep 2007         permanent link

Categories: banks, crisis, regulation

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Carry trades and hedging

Stephen Jen and Luca Bindelli argue in a post at the Morgan Stanley Global Economic Forum that currency hedging produces much of the effects that are commonly attributed to carry trades. Jen and Luca Bindelli are absolutely right in arguing that:

However, to replicate the carry trade effect, Jen and Bindelli need to make the further assumption that the hedge ratio depends on the cost of hedging as measured by interest rate differentials. I would argue that the part of the hedge that depends on interest rate differentials is a speculative position masquerading as a hedge. In Black’s universal hedging model (“Equilibrium Exchange Rate Hedging”, Journal of Finance, 45(3), 899-907) the hedge ratio is a constant across all currency pairs and the primary reason for the hedge ratio to differ from unity is Siegel’s paradox. Even if one employs more general models, it is difficult to see a role for interest rate differentials in determining the optimal hedge ratio if one assumes that the forward rates are equilibrium rates.

The assumption that forward rates are incorrect and therefore (via interest rate parity) that interest rate differentials are irrational, is a speculative position which is the core of the carry trade phenomenon. It is difficult to regard this as hedging.

Posted at 12:18 pm IST on Sat, 8 Sep 2007         permanent link

Categories: international finance, risk management

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SEBI proposes fast track issuance of securities

The Securities and Exchange Board of India has announced its intention to allow fast track issuance of securities under certain conditions. It is nice to see SEBI doing something constructive to make the primary market smoother and more efficient.

A spate of investor complaints after the IPOs of 1995-96 led to a regulatory clampdown that has had a chilling effect on the primary market. In 1995-96, the capital raised through the primary market was more than 6.5% of gross domestic capital formation. Despite a revival in the primary market in 2005-06 and 2006-07, the capital raised in these years is less than 2.5% of gross domestic capital formation.

The regulatory clampdown has also led to the partial exporting of our primary market. In 2006-07, the capital raised in the foreign (ADR/GDR) market was about half of that raised in the domestic primary market. In 1995-96, the corresponding figure was only 11% and until 1996-97, this figure had never crossed 25%.

A lot needs to be done to make the primary market vibrant once again. The fast track issuance scheme addresses some of the needs of well established companies trying to do a follow-on issue. The needs of the IPO market also need to be addressed in course of time.

Posted at 7:57 pm IST on Sun, 26 Aug 2007         permanent link

Categories: equity markets, regulation

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US regulatory framework and light touch regulation

An IMF working paper published this month forced me to rethink the often repeated contrast between the heavy handed rule based US regulatory framework and the light touch principles based system in the UK. The paper New Landscape, New Challenges: Structural Change and Regulation in the U.S. Financial Sector by Ashok Vir Bhatia argues that the US financial sector is divided into a tightly regulated core and a loosely regulated periphery. The tightly regulated core consisting of the banks and depository institutions, the housing sector federal agencies and the big five investment banks today account only for a third of the US financial assets. The remaining two-thirds of the assets are in the periphery which is subject to Bernanke’s “regulation by the invisible hand” of market discipline.

Bhatia argues in particular that “the Fed [serves] a singular role as guardian against more dirigiste temptations.” I think this is an important point – there is little doubt that the US Fed has a significantly lighter touch regulatory mindset than the US SEC. This is also an aspect that is often missed in the simple US versus UK dichotomy of rules versus principles based regulation.

Where the rules based approach is most dominant in the United States is in the area of consumer protection which is of course dominated by the SEC. The UK has shown the way in applying principles based regulation even here and this is a model that is worth emulating. However, the US model shows how great the benefits are of a light touch regulation applied only to the periphery. The vibrancy of the US financial sector is due doubtless to this light touch. For countries like India whose financial sector is repressed by heavy handed regulation, applying light touch to the periphery is a low hanging fruit that can be plucked quite easily and with low risk.

Posted at 4:44 pm IST on Mon, 20 Aug 2007         permanent link

Categories: regulation

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Regulating External Commercial Borrowings

Dr. Shankar Acharya and I participated in a discussion on the business news channel CNBC about the move by the Indian government to restrict external commercial borrowings. Both of us agreed that the ECB window was a very selective opening up of the capital account. My concern was that ECBs allowed the corporate sector to obtain cheap foreign debt while preventing individuals from tapping foreign markets to get cheap home loans. Dr. Acharya’s concern was that even within the corporate sector, the ECB window was being used largely by a handful of companies.

Both of us also agreed that in the long term, India needs a vibrant domestic financial system that is well integrated into the global capital markets. We disagreed about the timing and sequencing of these reforms. Dr. Acharya argued that the weaknesses of the domestic financial system (particularly the state owned banking system) need to be addressed first and that capital account opening must be gradual. My argument was that the best way to strengthen the domestic financial sector is to open it up to foreign competition and that we need to move rapidly on capital account convertibility.

Posted at 9:52 pm IST on Thu, 9 Aug 2007         permanent link

Categories: international finance

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SEBI Report on Dedicated Infrastructure Funds

The Securities and Exchange Board of India has published the Report and Recommendations of the Committee on Launch of Dedicated Infrastructure Funds by Mutual Funds

I have been a firm supporter of allowing domestic hedge funds, private equity funds, real estate funds and other alternative investment vehicles. I would also welcome retail access to these products with appropriate risk disclosures. Thus in principle, I have no problem with the proposed Dedicated Infrastructure Funds. My difficulty is that the report does not justify why an exception should be made only for infrastructure funds while keeping the lid shut on all other alternative investment vehicles.

From the perspective of a securities regulator, the justification for a retail product has to be in terms of the risk-reward profile that the product provides to the investor. The report is silent on this and talks only about the need for infrastructure for the economy. The most depressing statement in the report is the statement in the report that:

The nature of infrastructure projects ... will include a gestation period where the project could be loss making. Thus, the NAV performance of the [Dedicated Infrastructure Funds] may suffer during the initial periods. This could have a negative impact on the listed price and generate adverse reactions from investors who exit early. Hence providing a listing window of 24 months will help the [Dedicated Infrastructure Fund] to deploy a substantial portion of the funds as well as some investments might move beyond the initial construction / build-out period.

To my mind, this amounts to cheating the investors by deliberately concealing information from them. In a rational market, investors should be trusted to understand that there will be losses in the gestation period. If they do not, then they are not appropriate investors for the fund.

I strongly believe that permitting retail access to a financial products should be based primarily on whether the product fulfills an investor need and only secondarily (if at all) not on whether it fulfills the need of the issuer (infrastructure developer in this case) or the intermediary (the mutual fund in this case).

I also think that it is far better to liberalize regulations across the board to provide investors access to a wide range of financial products than to make an exception for one special interest group. The regulatory goal has to be to increase innovation, competition and market completeness. That calls for a wide range of alternate investment vehicles.

Posted at 5:43 pm IST on Tue, 7 Aug 2007         permanent link

Categories: crisis, mutual funds, regulation

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Manipulating Closing Prices: The randomization antidote

Manipulation of closing pricing appears to be happening in some of the most liquid markets in the world, and randomization might be the most effective antidote to the problem. I blogged about Amaranth’s manipulation of Nymex natural gas closing prices last week. Dealbook talks about an episode in Blackstone’ shares:

Units of Blackstone ... nosedived for much of the day, dipping as low as $23.27, down 8.8 percent from Wednesday’s close of $25.51, by mid-afternoon. But a mysterious frenzy of trades just before the market’s close helped erase the entire day’s losses and push the stock up to $25.70.

Starting in the last 10 minutes, a series of rapid-fire buy orders helped push up the stock’s price. Among them was a block trade of 114,000 units, which was one of the biggest trade of the day. The time? It was executed at 3:59:55 p.m.

Averaging the last few minutes of trading helps but not completely because the manipulator knows the averaging algorithm used by the exchange. The key insight in my view is to think of this as a game between the exchange and the manipulator in which the exchange moves first and the manipulator can decide his response accordingly.

Game theory would suggest that the exchange use a mixed strategy involving randomization of the time slots over which averaging is done. This neutralizes the advantage that the manipulator has in the current system of moving second. The random time slots could be chosen by sampling from say a beta distribution with shape parameters alpha>1 and beta=1 that produces an increasing probability density function. This would ensure that most time slots would be from the final minutes of trading, but occasionally, there would be a time slot from earlier in the day.

Using public key encryption technology, it is possible for the exchange to announce the actual time slots resulting from the random sampling in advance in a manner which is verifiable ex post but not readable ex ante. This ensures that the exchange cannot manipulate the sample either.

Posted at 2:24 pm IST on Tue, 31 Jul 2007         permanent link

Categories: exchanges, manipulation

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Amaranth Natural Gas Manipulation

The civil complaint filed by CFTC against Amaranth has a fascinating description of how Amaranth allegedly manipulated the settlement price of natural gas futures. The most interesting part is Exhibit C which contains the letter that Amaranth wrote to the exchange explaining its unusual trading in the final minutes of trading on expiry day. It tells a story of Amaranth trying to reduce its calendar spread position by first reducing the far month position and then reducing the near month position by the same amount. Amaranth argued that the near (expiring) month trades took place in the last few minutes because that was when the extent of reduction in the far month position became clear.

The CFTC complaint contains a whole set of instant messages (IM) exchanged by Amaranth’s traders about the manipulation that they were attempting. What is interesting about many of these instant messages is that they also show the IM Administrator sending messages to all participants stating “Note: This session is recorded and this recording is the sole property of Amaranth”. This does not appear to have deterred the traders from talking of their manipulation quite explicitly.

Posted at 9:56 pm IST on Thu, 26 Jul 2007         permanent link

Categories: bankruptcy, investigation, manipulation

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Regulation of Clearing Corporations

Last month, the Ministry of Finance in India put out a discussion paper on the regulatory framework for clearing corporations, but I got around to reading this only now.

The discussion paper says that the exchanges should have only trading members and the clearing corporation should have only clearing members. This seems to imply that the clearing members should all be professional trading members that clear for others but not for themselves. I do not see the logic for such a requirement. The large trading members would normally want to clear their own trades.

The regulatory framework is perhaps hobbled by the enabling legislation itself, but I think there is a clear need for clearing corporations to provide clearing services for a wide range of contracts including not only equities and bonds but also derivatives on equities, interest rates, currencies and commodities. The discussion paper seems to have a different take on this:

Since CCs need to have dedicated resources to meet the exigencies of settlement, it would not ordinarily undertake any other activity which can have contagion effect on the adequacy of its resources. However, it may be allowed to take up other activities not related to securities settlement with prior approval of SEBI.

Finally, the rationale for the clearing corporation to be 51% owned by exchanges is not clear. First of all, exchanges in the context of SCRA probably means only stock exchanges and thus the proposal rules out major participation by commodity exchanges. Secondly, this legislates the “silo” model of clearing and trading that is quite controversial today. It appears to rule out user owned clearing corporations. This provision could also impede competition among exchanges by not allowing an upstart exchange to gain ground by using the services of an established clearing corporation.

Posted at 12:23 pm IST on Thu, 19 Jul 2007         permanent link

Categories: derivatives, exchanges, risk management

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SEC and IFRS - Embrace, extend and extinguish?

The US SEC yesterday released the proposed rules allowing foreign issuers to file their financial statements using the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the International Accounting Standards Board. This proposal is certainly welcome, but one consequence of this is likely to be the emergence of a US flavour of IFRS.

Many countries that have adopted IFRS as their national accounting standard have effected some carve-outs or made some modifications in the interpretation of these standards. When foreign issuers file under IFRS, the US SEC reviews the financial standards for conformity with the original IFRS and not with the jurisdictional variant followed in the issuer’s home country.

Moreover, IAS 8 “Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors,” suggests that when the IASB’s standard or interpretations do not address a matter, issuers should look to the most recent pronouncements of other standard-setting bodies. The SEC’s proposal states (page 61-62):

An issuer using IFRS as published by the IASB, although not required to follow U.S. GAAP guidance, may find reference to FRRs, ASRs, SABs, and Industry Guides and other forms of U.S. GAAP guidance useful in the application of IAS 8.

In addition, the SEC states (page 61):

We believe that a company that would no longer be required to reconcile its IFRS financial statements to U.S. GAAP under the proposed amendments, and its auditor, would continue to be required to follow any Commission guidance that relates to auditing issues.

In addition, foreign private issuers are required to have audits conducted in accordance with the Standards of the PCAOB (U.S.)/U.S. Generally Accepted Audit Standards regardless of the comprehensive basis of accounting they use to prepare their financial statements.

The SEC also points out (page 79) that under current PCAOB standards when SEC filings are audited by foreign audit firms, these audit firms must have policies that provide for review of these filings by persons knowledgeable in accounting, auditing and independence standards generally accepted in the United States.

What all of this means is that the US which has not adopted IFRS at all might still be able to create a US variant of the IFRS. Over time, this variant (more rule based than principles based) may become highly influential and could even become the dominant flavour of IFRS. If this happens, the SEC’s stance could begin to resemble the “Embrace, extend and extinguish” strategy long associated with Microsoft.

Posted at 1:36 pm IST on Wed, 4 Jul 2007         permanent link

Categories: accounting

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Australian court rules that Chinese walls need not be perfect

I am not a lawyer and the judgement of the Federal Court of Australia dismissing insider trading and conflict of interest charges against Citigroup is 120 pages long, but the sum and substance of the judgement seems to be that absolute perfection is not required in Chinese wall arrangements. The judgement says:

But what the unscripted actions of Mr Sinclair and Mr Darwell show is the practical impossibility of ensuring that every conceivable risk is covered by written procedures and followed by employees.

However, the arrangements required to satisfy s 1043F(b) of the Corporations Act do not require a standard of absolute perfection. The test stated in the section is an objective one. It is, “arrangements that could reasonably be expected to ensure that the information was not communicated”.

In my view, the arrangements referred to by Mr Monaci in his written statement were sufficient to meet the requirements of s 1043F(b). They did not, in express terms, anticipate the situation which arose on 19 August 2005 but they laid down general procedures which could reasonably be expected to ensure that legal or compliance officers of Citigroup vetted any communication of potentially price sensitive information to prevent it crossing the Chinese wall.

The other important part of the judgement is that parties can contract out of a fiduciary relationship. The acquirer’s mandate letter stated that Citigroup was engaged “as an independent contractor and not in any other capacity including as a fiduciary”. With the court holding that this clause absolved Citigroup of all fiduciary (conflict of interest) responsibilities, language of this kind will probably become even more commonplace than it is now.

Posted at 2:10 pm IST on Thu, 28 Jun 2007         permanent link

Categories: banks, corporate governance, regulation

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Problems in US regulation of public offerings

Two events this week have highlighted the persistent problems in US regulation of public offerings: first was the unacceptable effect that the quiet period regulation had on the Blackstone IPO and the other was the decision by the SEC to further tighten short selling activities during a public offering.

While the Blackstone IPO was in progress, a bill was introduced in the US Congress to increase the tax rates applicable to listed private equity firms. Since this proposal came with a five year breather, the market would have benefited from an analysis by the company explaining the tax incidence in the light of anticipated profit realization during the next five years. Unfortunately, as the Lex column in the Financial Times pointed out (“Blackstone’s tax bill”, June 18, 2007), the quiet period regulation prevented Blackstone from commenting on the situation at all. This is a totally unacceptable outcome. Clearly, the regulations that were framed long ago in a much slower paced era need to change to keep up with the times.

Sometimes, however, when regulations are changed, they are changed for the worse. The SEC’s proposal to tighten short selling restrictions during public offerings of securities is an example of this kind. The SEC states:

When a trader expects to receive shares in an offering, there is an incentive to sell short prior to pricing an offering and then cover that short position with shares bought at the reduced offering price. By doing so, the trader can cover the short sale with minimal risk, and generally lock in a guaranteed profit – to the detriment of the issuer and the other shareholders.

The amendments change the way the rule works to prevent this from happening. They replace the rule's current limitation on covering the short sales in the offering with a prohibition on purchasing in the offering after a short sale in the securities. This change was triggered by persistent non-compliance with the rule and a string of strategies to conceal the prohibited covering. Under the amended rule, if a person sells short during the restricted period prior to pricing, that person is prohibited from purchasing the offered security. Thus, the amended rule changes the prohibited activity from covering to purchasing the offered security.

Accurate price discovery is as important (if not more important) during a public offering as at other times and short selling is a critical element of good price discovery. In the absence of this process, there is a risk that companies and their underwriters would be able to manipulate the market and overprice their issues. In this light, the rule proposed by the SEC is a step in the wrong direction.

Posted at 3:16 pm IST on Fri, 22 Jun 2007         permanent link

Categories: equity markets, regulation, short selling

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Equities drive Mumbai into global list on financial flows

The Indian financial press has widely reported the Mastercard Centres of Commerce 2007 study that listed Mumbai among the top 10 cities in the world in terms of financial flows ahead of Hong Kong and Shanghai. Many of these reports did not mention that despite faring so well on this sub index, Mumbai ranks 45th out of 50 in the overall index of global centres while Hong Kong ranks 5th.

Mumbai ranks high only in the financial flows sub index while ranking near the bottom (below 40) on all other components. Even within the financial flows sub index, Mumbai owes its place primarily to the vibrant equities market. (Measuring derivative activity in terms of number of contracts also helps since the single stock futures contracts popular in India have small contract sizes.) Even then, the gap separating Mumbai (38.71) from Shanghai (38.30) and Hong Kong (38.06) is quite low compared to the gap that separates Mumbai from Seoul (53.00) or Tokyo (53.39).

The Mastercard study serves to remind us that the equity markets are the real success story in Indian financial sector reform. We do need to replicate this success in other sectors.

Posted at 3:29 pm IST on Tue, 19 Jun 2007         permanent link

Categories: international finance

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US SEC abolishes the uptick rule

The US SEC has finally decided to abolish the rule that prohibited shares being shorted except on an uptick. The surprising thing is that it has taken 70 years (almost three generations) to get rid of a stupid idea that entered the statute book in 1938.

Of course, in a balancing act, the SEC also tightened rules on “naked short selling”. There is a genuine problem that these rules are trying to address, but this problem is not short selling, it is failed settlement. Though the US has a three day settlement cycle, an unacceptably large proportion of trades fail to settle for several days beyond that date.

It is really fortunate that India avoided importing the system of “continuous net settlement” which is the root of the settlement problem in the US. The Indian approach of ruthless penalties for settlement failures is the right solution to this problem. Instead the SEC wants to look at the whether the failure was intentional or unintentional. It uses silly notions like “abusive short selling” to decide which settlement failures ought to be penalized. It is much better to focus on consequences and penalize all failures regardless of intention. The Indian system has the additional advantage of using a civil liability to deal with a contractual violation. The US system tries to elevate a contractual violation to the level of a fraud.

At a deeper level, the problem of naked short selling is a failure of the securities lending system. The US has a highly developed system for this, but even this system does not work well for all stocks. India faces the challenge of building a securities lending system from scratch, but without any past baggage, it has the potential to build a system with universal access.

Posted at 2:27 pm IST on Thu, 14 Jun 2007         permanent link

Categories: regulation, short selling

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PIPE deals as regulatory arbitrage

Sjostrom has an excellent paper on SSRN about how PIPE (Private Investment in Public Equity) deals can be regarded as a form of regulatory arbitrage. Sjostrom’s argument is that the hedge fund that invests in a PIPE deal is performing the same economic function as an underwriter without being subject to either the NASD’s cap on maximum underwriting fees or the due diligence liability that the SEC imposes on underwriters. The paper also argues against the harsh posture that the SEC has adopted against PIPE deals.

I agree with much of this analysis but this line of thinking raises a few other broader issues that Sjostrom does not touch upon:

In an earlier blog entry, I argued that “Regulators however continue to act as if anything unfamiliar is worse than the status quo even when it is potentially better.” The SEC’s response to PIPE deals seems to fit this description. PIPE deals which are not of the death spiral variety appear to me to be a very legitimate financing vehicle

Posted at 2:57 pm IST on Wed, 13 Jun 2007         permanent link

Categories: arbitrage, equity markets, regulation

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Spitzer Commission on Financial Regulation

Last week, Eliot Spitzer, Governor of New York created the New York State Commission to Modernize the Regulation of Financial Services. Among the reasons for setting up the Commission, Spitzer’s order refers to:

The mandate of the Commission is to suggest regulatory changes needed to:

This mandate appears to me to be well balanced and sound. I like the pro competitive and pro market approach to regulation. As Attorney General of New York, Spitzer earned a reputation for tough enforcement of laws. Tough enforcement makes sense only when the laws themselves are sound as Stigler taught us in his classic paper 35 years ago (Stigler, J. “The optimum enforcement of laws”, Journal of Political Economy, 1970, 526-536). As Governor, Spitzer now has a chance to work on that side of the equation as well.

Frank Partnoy has an article in the Financial Times of June 6, 2007 (“A gamekeeper turns to the poachers”) defending Spitzer’s decision to appoint senior executives from financial services firms on this Commission.

Posted at 3:38 pm IST on Thu, 7 Jun 2007         permanent link

Categories: regulation

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